Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs

1988

The State of Utah v. Mark Talbot : Reply Brief
Utah Court of Appeals

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Marcus Taylor; Labrum and Taylor.
Patrick B. Nolan; Garfield County Attorney.
Recommended Citation
Reply Brief, Utah v. Talbot, No. 880342 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1988).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1/1121

This Reply Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of Appeals
Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

»nifcr

UTAH
DOCUMENT

KFU
50
•A10

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

DOCKET NO. ffi "QS^jZ

„

THE STATE OF UTAH,

*

Plaintiff and Appellant,

*

v.

*

MARK TALBOT,

*

Defendant and Respondent.

Case No. 880342-CA

Argument Priority
Classification:

*

REPLY BRIEF OF THE APPELLANT

Appeal from the Circuit Court of Garfield County, Panguitch City
Department, Honorable David L. Mower, Judge.

Marcus Taylor
LABRUM, TAYLOR & BLACKWELL
108 North Main Street
P.O. Box 724
Richfield, Utah 84701
Telephone: (801) 896-6484

Patrick B. Nolan
GARFIELD COUNTY ATTORNEY
55 South Main Street
P.O. Box 388
Panguitch, Utah 84759
Telephone: (801) 676-2290

Attorney for Respondent

Attorney for Appellant

toGl 6 1990

r~

FILED
MAR 3 1 1 9 8 9

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff and Appellant,

Case No. 880342-CA

v.
MARK TALBOT,

*

Defendant and Respondent.

Argument Priority
Classification:

*

REPLY BRIEF OF THE APPELLANT

Appeal from the Circuit Court of Garfield County, Panguitch City
Department, Honorable David L. Mower, Judge.

Marcus Taylor
LABRUM, TAYLOR & BLACKWELL
108 North Main Street
P.O. Box 724
Richfield, Utah 84701
Telephone: (801) 896-6484

Patrick B. Nolan
GARFIELD COUNTY ATTORNEY
55 South Main Street
P.O. Box 388
Panguitch, Utah 84759
Telephone: (801) 676-2290

Attorney for Respondent

Attorney for Appellant

TABLE OF CONTENTS
PAGE
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

i

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

1

ARGUMENT

2
I.

THERE WAS REASONABLE SUSPICION TO STOP
THE DEFENDANT ' S VEHICLE

2

II. THE STOP WAS INCIDENT TO TRAFFIC VIOLATIONS.. 6
III. EVEN IF THE ORIGINAL STOP WAS IMPROPER,
DEFENDANT'S CONSENT TO SEARCH HIS VEHICLE
PURGED ANY TAINT OF ILLEGALITY

8

CONCLUSION

10

MAILING CERTIFICATE

11

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases

Page

Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979)

4

Ingersoll v. Palmer, 43 Cal. 3d 1321, 743 P.2d 1299
(1987)

4

State v. Arroyo, 102 U.A.R. 34 (Utah App. 1989)
•

2,7,8,9

State v. Aquilar, 758 P.2d 457 (Utah App. 1988)

8,9

State v. Ayala, 762 P.2d 1107 (Utah App. 1988)

7

State v. Babbell, 103 U.A.R. 14 (Utah 1989)

9

State v. Baird, 94 U.A.R. 40, 763 P.2d 1214
(Utah App. 1988)

5

State v. Cole, 674 P.2d 119 (Utah 1983)

4

State v. Crary, No. CRA 83-32 (Third Dist. Ct. 1983)

4

State v. Dorsey, 731 P.2d 1085 (Utah 1986)

2,3

State v. Elliott,626 P.2d 423 (Utah 1981)

3,5,7

State v. Johnson, 104 U.A.R. 34 (Utah App. 1989)

5

State v. Sierra, 754 P.2d 972 (Utah App. 1988)

2,5,6,8,9

State v. Superior Court, 143 Ariz. 45, 691 P.2d 1073
(Arizona 1984)
Statutes and Court Rules

4

Utah Code Annotated Section 41-1-17

4

Utah Code Annotated Section 41-6-13

6

Utah Code Annotated Section 41-6-13.5

6

Utah Code Annotated Section 41-6-67

6

Utah Code Annotated Section 77-7-2

6,7,10

-i-

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES CONTINUED
Page
Utah Code Annotated Section 77-7-2 (3)

3

Utah Code Annotated Section 77-7-15

5,10

Rule 24 (J) , Rules of the Utah Court of Appeals

4

Rule 201, Utah Rules of Evidence

6

-ii-

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

1.

The officers in this case, viewed in the totality

of the circumstances, had reasonable suspicion to believe that the
defendant was engaged in criminal activity, when the defendant's
vehicle turned around and fled from the roadblock.

Therefore, pursuant

to Utah Code Annotated Section 77-7-15, the officers were entitled
to stop the defendant's vehicle, in order to investigate the matter
further.
2.

The defendant committed various traffic offenses in

the presence of the officers.

A reasonable police officer would

have stopped the defendant's vehicle for those violations.

Therefore,

the stop was also proper under Utah Code Annotated Section 77-72, incident to those traffic violations.
3.

Even if this Court should find that the initial

stop

was improper, the State was not permitted by the Court below to
introduce any evidence of matters which occurred after the stop
itself, including consent to search the vehicle.

Therefore, this

case should be remanded to the Circuit Court to make findings with
respect to consent to search the vehicle;

and, if it finds that

such consent was voluntarily given, the Motion to Suppress should
be denied, because such consent would purge any taint of illegality
from the stop itself.

-1-

STANDARD OF REVIEW

The trial court's factual evaluation underlying
its decision to grant or deny a motion to suppress
will not be disturbed unless it is clearly erroneous,
since the trial judge is in the best position
to assess the witnesses' credibility. ... However,
in reviewing the trial courtf s legal conclusions
based on those findings, we afford no deference
and apply a_ correction of error standard.
(Emphasis added.)
State v. Arroyo, 102 U.A.R.
34 (Utah App. 1989) at 34-35.

ARGUMENT
POINT I:
VEHICLE.

THERE WAS REASONABLE SUSPICION TO STOP THE DEFENDANT'S
In State v. Sierra, 754 P.2d 972 (Utah App. 1988), this

Court held that an investigatory stop of a vehicle can be constitutionally justified on one of two alternative grounds:
First, it could be based on specific, articulable
facts which, together with rational inferences
drawn from those facts, would lead a reasonable
person to conclude [the defendant] had committed
or was about to commit a crime. ... 754 P.2d
at 975.
In State v. Dorsey, 731 P.2d 1085 (Utah 1986), in discussing
probable cause for a vehicle search, the Utah Supreme Court observed
as follows:
The validity of the probable cause determination
is made from the objective standpoint of a "prudent,
reasonable, cautious police officer... guided
by his experience and training." ... Police
officers by virtue of their experience and training
can sometimes recognize illegal activity where
ordinary citizens would not. Some recognition
should appropriately be given to that experience
and training where there are objective facts
to justify the ultimate conclusion. ... 731
P.2d at 1088.
-2-

In State v. Elliott, 626 P.2d 423 (Utah 1981), the Utah
Supreme Court considered a case where the officer received a report
that two persons, driving a vehicle with out-of-state plates, were
trying to sell tires and auto parts at drastically reduced prices.
When the officer attempted to pull the vehicle over, the defendants
fled.

The officer had previously recovered a stolen vehicle under

similar circumstances.

The Court found that, under these facts,

there were sufficient articulable facts and inferences to justify
the stop of the defendant.

In addition, the Court found:

...([T]he flight of defendants) also tends to
validate the arrest under [former section 7713-3 (3), now codified at Utah Code Annotated
Section 77-7-2 (3)]. It is true that flight
in the abstract is not sufficient to constitute
probable cause for arrest. However, when flight
is coupled with a_ reasonable belief that the
suspect is involved in criminal activity, there
exists probable cause for arrest. (Emphasis
added. ) 626 P.2d at 427.
In defendant's Brief, it is claimed that the officers
in this case could not articulate any objective facts to support
a reasonable suspicion that defendant was involved in criminal acti
First, it is clear that the officers observed defendant turn around
and flee from the roadblock.

Sheriff Judd has had experience as

a law enforcement officer, in dealing with cars which turn around
and flee from roadblocks.

That experience helped to form the basis

of his suspicion that the defendant was involved in criminal activi
pursuant to the reasoning set forth in State v. Dorsey, cited above
However, the trial court refused to permit Sheriff Judd to testify
about that experience, as a basis for his reasonable suspicion.
(Tr., pp. 11-16, 38-39)

The State submits that the Court erred

in excluding that proffered evidence, and that such error should
be corrected by this Court under the "correction of error" standard

of review applicable in this case.

If that evidence is deemed to

be admissible by this Court, it helps to form the basis for reasonable
suspicion to stop the defendant's vehicle in this case.
Second, contrary to the claim made in defendant's Brief,
the record reflects that the Sheriff clearly articulated the following
reasons for stopping the defendant's vehicle:

(1) the lateness

of the hour; (2) the lack of any other traffic; (3) the flashing
lights at the roadblock; (4) the abrupt stop of the vehicle, when
it came upon the lights at the roadblock; (5) the turn-around on
the crest of the hill, as soon as the driver noticed the roadblock;
and (6) the turn-around in the middle of the road, on a narrow mountain
road, rather than at a turn-out or some other, safer place.

1. In defendant's letter of supplemental authorities dated March
21, 1989, submitted under Rule 24 (j), Rules of the Utah Court of
Appeals, reference is made to Ingersoll v. Palmer, 43 Cal.3d 1321,
743 P.2d 1299 (1987). That case sustained the constitutionality
of a roadblock sobriety checkpoint in California, an issue which
is not before the Court in this case. However, it is interesting
to note that, just as in this case, cars which avoided the checkpoint
would be stopped, if, in avoiding the checkpoint, the driver did
anything unlawful, or exhibited obvious signs of impairment. 743
P.2d at 1309, fn. 5.
Defendant's letter of supplemental authorities also cites
State v. Crary, No. CRA 83-32, a 1983 case out of the Third District
Court in Salt Lake County. That Court relied on Utah Code Annotated
Section 41-1-17; Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979); an Arizona
case which has since been clarified (see, State v. Superior Court,
143 Ariz. 45, 691 P.2d 1073 (Arizona 1984)); and State v. Cole,
674 P.2d 119 (Utah 1983). In view of the development of the law
in the numerous cases decided in this area by the appellate Courts
of this State during the five (5) years since that decision by the
District Court, its precedential value at this point would appear
to be negligible, at best.
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Pursuant to State v. Elliott, cited above, the fact of defendant's
flight,coupled with the foregoing specific, articulable facts, would
lead any reasonable police officer to suspect that the defendant
was engaged in criminal activity, in light of his training and experience .
This is not a case involving a so-called "pretext" stop,
such as this Court recently found in State v. Baird, 94 U.A.R. 40,
763 P.2d 1214 (Utah App. 1988), where the stop was based on the
officer's testimony that there was "something funny" about the license
plate

sticker on the vehicle;

or in State v. Sierra, cited above,

where the stop was based on the defendants' out-of-state license
plates,"suspicious nature", and reaction to the officer.

Instead,

this case is much more akin to State v. Johnson, 104 U.A.R. 34 (Utah
App. 1989), where this Court recently found reasonable suspicion
that a vehicle was stolen, where the owner of the vehicle was absent,
and the defendant was unable to produce the registration
vehicle.

for the

This Court found that Utah Code Annotated Section 77-7-

15 permitted the officer to conduct further investigation, and the
same conclusion should be reached in this case.
The State respectfully submits that the facts of this
case, viewed in the totality of the circumstances,

should lead

this Court to conclude that there was reasonable suspicion to stop
the defendant's vehicle in this case.

Therefore, the conclusion

by the Circuit Court that there was no reason to suspect criminal
activity in this case is clearly erroneous, and the Order Suppressing
Evidence should be reversed by this Court.
-5-

POINT II:

THE STOP WAS INCIDENT TO TRAFFIC VIOLATIONS.
The second basis for justification of a vehicle stop,

under State v. Sierra, cited above, is where the stop is incident
to a lawful citation for a traffic violation.

In Sierra, this Court

held:
A police officer may, however, stop an automobile
for a traffic violation committed in the officer's
presence. ...
In determining whether a stop for a traffic
violation and subsequent arrest is a pretext,
the totality of the circumstances governs....
In making this determination the subjective
intent of the officer is irrelevant. ...
Thus, in determining whether [the officers1]
stop of [the defendant] for [traffic violations]
was an unconstitutional pretext, we focus on
whether a_ hypothetical reasonable officer , in
view of the totality of the circumstances, ... which
have stopped
[the defendant ] t_o issue a. warni~ng
for [the traffic violation]. The proper inquiry
does not focus on whether the officer could
validly have made the stop. ... (Emphasis added.)
754 P.2d at 977-78.
In his Brief, defendant claims that no traffic violations
occurred prior to the stop of defendant's vehicle.

On the contrary,

in the Circuit Court, the State extensively briefed and argued the
application of Utah Code Annotated Sections 41-6-13, 41-6-13.5,
and 77-7-2, at the roadblock; and the trial Court was also entitled
to take judicial notice of the fact that a car turning around on
the crest of a hill, on a narrow mountain road, could be in violation
of Utah Code Annotated Section 41-6-67, pursuant to Rule 201, Utah
Rules of Evidence.

In addition, defendant's vehicle failed to stop

in response to the red light from the pursuing posse vehicle, and
took evasive action, on the way back to Panguitch, and once it arrived
in town, thereby committing separate and independent traffic violations
under Sections 41-6-13 and 41-6-13.5.

Thus, it is clearly proper

for this Court to conclude that a reasonable police officer would

have stopped the defendant's vehicle in this case, unlike Sierra.
Cf. State v, Arroyo, 102 U.A.R. 34 (Utah App. 1989).
This case is much like State v. Elliott, cited above,
where the Court found that, in addition to the fact

of the defendants'

flight, coupled with reasonable suspicion, the officer had grounds
to arrest the defendant for various public offenses committed in
his presence, including reckless driving, littering, failure to display
a safety inspection sticker, and failure to stop at the officer's
signal, any one of which would have been sufficient.

626 P.2d at

427.
The State respectfully submits that, in consideration of
the totality of the circumstances, from the time the defendant's
vehicle turned and fled from the scene at the roadblock, and took
evasive action, both on the way back down to Panguitch, and in Panguitch,
until actually stopped, a reasonable police officer would have observed
various traffic violations committed in the officer's presence;
and, under Utah Code Annotated Section 77-7-2, would have had grounds
to stop the defendant's vehicle in this case, incident to those
traffic violations, and search the same.
P.2d 1107 (Utah App. 1988).

See, State v. Ayala, 762

Therefore, the State respectfully submits

that the Circuit Court erred in concluding to the contrary, and
that the Order Suppressing Evidence should be reversed by this Court.
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POINT III: EVEN IF THE ORIGINAL STOP WAS IMPROPER, DEFENDANT'S
CONSENT TO SEARCH HIS VEHICLE PURGED ANY TAINT OF ILLEGALITY.
In State v. Sierra, cited above, even though it found
the initial stop to be illegal, this Court then considered whether
the defendant's consent to search the vehicle was sufficient to
purge the stop of illegality.

Because the record in Sierra was

not clear on that point, this Court remanded the case back to the
trial court for a determination of whether the consent to the search
was voluntary.

754 P.2d at 981.

Sierra was decided by this Court on May 18, 1988.

On

July 19, 1988, this Court handed down its opinion in State v. Aquilar,
758 P.2d 457 (Utah App. 1988).

In that case, in reliance upon Sierra,

this Court found that the defendant had voluntarily consented to
a search of

his vehicle; and, therefore, that the question of the

propriety of the stop need not be addressed, because the consent
purged the taint of any prior illegality.

758 P.2d at 458-59.

Finally, on February 15, 1989, this Court decided State
v. Arroyo, 102 U.A.R. 34 (Utah App. 1989).

In that case, even though

this Court found the original stop to be improper, the Court then
determined that the defendant's subsequent voluntary consent purged
the taint of illegality from the original stop, and that the motion
to suppress should not have been granted.

102 U.A.R. at 35.

In this case, as in Arroyo, after objection by defense
counsel, the Circuit Court denied the State an opportunity to introduce any evidence relating to matters that occurred after the defendant's
vehicle was stopped, including the issue of consent to search.
(See, e.g., Tr. , pp. 52-53; 85-89)

Consequently, the record is

not clear, nor did the Circuit Court make any findings, with respect
-8-

to the issue of consent to search the defendant's vehicle.
Furthermore, this issue was not clearly defined under
Utah law at the time the suppression hearing
on March 17, 1988.

was held in this case

This Court decided Sierra, Aquilar, and Arroyo

all after that hearing was held.

Therefore, without prior direction

by the appellate courts of this state as to the relationship between
consent searches and vehicle stops, this point could not realistically
have been raised by the State prior to this appeal.

See, State

v. Babbell, 103 U.A.R. 14 (Utah 1989).
In view of the foregoing circumstances and time frame,
and in reliance upon State v. Sierra, the State respectfully submits
that, even if this Court finds the original stop to be improper,
this Court should remand the case back to the Circuit Court to determine
the issue of consent to search the defendant's vehicle; and, if
that Court finds that such consent was voluntarily given, then the
taint of the illegal stop would be purged, and the Motion to Suppress
should have been denied.

-9-

CONCLUSION

For all of the foregoing reasons, the second Conclusion
of Law entered by the Circuit Court was clearly erroneous.

The

officers had reasonable suspicion to stop the defendant's vehicle,
pursuant to Utah Code Annotated Section 77-7-15.

The stop was also

proper as incident to traffic violations committed in the presence
of the officers, under Utah Code Annotated Section 77-7-2. The Order
Suppressing Evidence should be reversed.
Finally, the Circuit Court erred in not permitting the
State to introduce evidence with respect to consent to search the
vehicle.

Therefore, if this Court finds the initial stop to be improper,

the case should be remanded back to the Circuit Court to make findings
as to the issue of consent to search the vehicle; and, if such consent
was voluntarily given, the Order Suppressing Evidence should be
reversed.
DATED this 31st day of March, 1989.

PATRICK B. NOLAN
Garfield County Attorney
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